World-China Forum

Thoroughly Modern Marx

The economic crisis has spawned a resurgence of interest in Karl Marx. Worldwide sales of Das Kapital have shot up (one lone German publisher sold thousands of copies in 2008, compared with 100 the year before), a measure of a crisis so broad in scope and devastation that it has global capitalism—and its high priests—in an ideological tailspin.

Yet even as faith in neoliberal orthodoxies has imploded, why resurrect Marx? To start, Marx was far ahead of his time in predicting the successful capitalist globalization of recent decades. He accurately foresaw many of the fateful factors that would give rise to today’s global economic crisis: what he called the “contradictions” inherent in a world comprised of competitive markets, commodity production, and financial speculation.

Penning his most famous works in an era when the French and American revolutions were less than a hundred years old, Marx had premonitions of AIG and Bear Stearns trembling a century and a half later. He was singularly cognizant of what he called the “most revolutionary part” played in human history by the bourgeoisie—those forerunners of today’s Wall Street bankers and corporate executives. As Marx put it in The Communist Manifesto, “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. . . . In one word, it creates a world after its own image.”

But Marx was no booster of capitalist globalization in his time or ours. Instead, he understood that “the need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe,” foreseeing that the development of capitalism would inevitably be “paving the way for more extensive and exhaustive crises.” Marx identified how disastrous speculation could trigger and exacerbate crises in the whole economy. And he saw through the political illusions of those who would argue that such crises could be permanently prevented through incremental reform. (Leo Panitch, Foreign Policy May/June)

China after Tiananmen

Spring always brings new blossoms, but 20 years ago, spring brought to China an unprecedented flowering. In hundreds of cities, citizens took to the streets in peaceful protests to demand freedom, government accountability and an end to corruption -- and the government, once among the most repressive on Earth, stood by and let them.

It was an intoxicating moment that didn't last. By the morning of June 4, the government had reversed course, sending the army to crush the long-running student demonstration in the capital's Tiananmen Square, leaving hundreds dead, and the Beijing spring was over.

Since that day, China has undergone such a broad transformation that it is almost unrecognizable. The economy has opened up to markets, private property and foreign trade. Living standards have soared. The government that once preached world revolution now provides credit to sustain American consumption. Chinese students go abroad to attend universities in bastions of capitalism.

But the bloody events of 1989 are still a live issue in China. Last month brought forth the posthumous secret memoir of Zhao Ziyang, the Communist Party chief removed because of his sympathy for the protesters. In it, he denounced the crackdown as "a tragedy to shock the world" and said his country deserved "a state more suitable to a democratic society." (Steve Chapman, Chicago Tribute)

Europe, China and the US---three contrasting models; liberal democracy in need of renewal

Someone should institute an annual 4 June review of the Chinese, European and American models. Why 4 June? Because on that day in 1989, the European and Chinese paths out of communism definitively diverged. I will never forget standing in a newspaper office in Warsaw, amid the exhilaration of Poland's first semi-free election since the imposition of ­communist rule, and feeling my stomach turn as I watched the pictures of dead or wounded protesters being ­carried out of Tiananmen Square.

Twenty years on, we have two sharply contrasting, imperial-scale models, Chinese and European. Both are unprecedented, complex and evolving; both are products of what happened in 1989. Their strengths and weaknesses are in many ways contrasting. The American system, meanwhile, though in fundamentals much less changed by that year, has gone through a cycle from hubristic overreach (the neocons' "unipolar moment") to traumatic retrenchment (General Motors, RIP), which itself had a lot to do with the United States' sense of world-historical triumph at the end of the cold war.

So far as I know, there are not many election posters on the streets of ­Beijing, let alone of Lhasa. The people cannot choose their representatives, except at a local level. But the Chinese system, as developed under a communist party that has consciously learned lessons from the collapse of communism in Europe and China's own crisis of 1989, has significant strengths of its own. China's regime depends on what its supporters call "performance legitimacy", rather than "procedural legitimacy". This, of course, raises the 64 trillion-renminbi question of what happens if it ceases to perform – that is, to deliver economic and social improvements to enough of the people enough of the time.

Meanwhile, there is nothing at all wrong with a peaceful competition of these systems. China is a mirror in which we can see the weaknesses of our own models; Europe and the US are mirrors in which they can see the weaknesses of theirs. Let this productive argument continue. Next report: 4 June 2010. (Timothy Garton Ash, Guardian)

It is China that holds the key to North Korea

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is taking advantage of Beijing’s desire for stability on the Korean peninsula by engaging in provocative actions that could permanently alter the north-east Asian security situation. Mr Kim’s moves are calculated – they are designed to help secure a dynastic succession and North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons power. Fearful of a flood of refugees should Mr Kim’s regime implode, China has responded cautiously. Beijing apparently still believes that its national interests are best served by a weak North Korean regime that is dependent on China.

The new nuclear and missile tests are just part of a series of provocative moves by Pyongyang this spring, but even by North Korean standards Mr Kim’s actions since April are outrageous. Yet China’s response has been very restrained. It argues that the best option for stability in North Korea is a smooth transition of power. It therefore is hesitant about supporting sanctions that really bite, such as cutting the supply of oil and coal, which would cripple the dysfunctional North Korean economy. True, such measures could destabilise the regime. But tough, targeted sanctions may get North Korea back to the negotiating table if done with a clear offer of resuming the principles of reciprocal action embedded in the February 2007 agreement. North Korea is not Iran. It does not have oil and gas to sell to get around sanctions. If left unchecked, surely Pyongyang will try to define a new reality that allows it to maintain nuclear weapons. Which is more destabilising: instability in succession or North Korea seeking to redefine the nuclear status of the Korean peninsula? That is the real question of instability before China.

Why is China so careful? It is partly the product of its historically strained relations with Mr Kim and worries that it may be embarrassed if it presses him without success. But Beijing also appears to have decided that the best chance of stability in North Korea lies in another hereditary transfer of power. By muting criticism of Pyongyang’s actions the Chinese are sending any contenders for power a strong message that China supports the current power arrangements. (Dennis Wilder, Financial Times)

China’s success outstrips democracy for now

Those who imagined in 1989 that the suppression of students marked the death throes of authoritarianism have been bitterly disappointed. Today, the Communist party’s knife is sharper and the hemp less knotty: it rules largely through the consent of a population grateful for its management of a breakneck economy and its restoration of China’s long-lost prestige. If there were elections tomorrow – What a way to mark the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen! – the Communist party would probably win by a landslide.

Martin Jacques, author of When China Rules the World, argues that China’s deep-seated Confucianism is incompatible with western-style democracy. He contends that to embrace democracy at this stage – halfway through China’s economic takeoff – would be to accept an “alien transplant”. If democracy does eventually emerge, he says, it is likely to be quite different from what westerners assume is their universal template.

Mr Jacques is right to argue that democracy, as patented by the west, is a product of European history, not a natural phenomenon. But he and others who emphasise the enduring nature of Chinese authoritarianism underestimate the attractiveness of the democratic idea itself. Soap and television are not universal either. But people the world over have grown to like them nonetheless. Representation and limits on absolute power are attractive concepts in their own right.

Zhao certainly thought so. Condemned to house arrest by the party he once headed, he spent years pondering the meaning of the Tiananmen uprising and its bloody suppression. His conclusion, so different from that of Deng, was that the Communist party should compete for power. Without checks, corruption would flourish and power would be abused, he said. After 20 years, Deng’s narrow view of democracy has prevailed. At some stage, a broader one will follow. (David Pilling, Financial Times)

How is the Chinese leadership divided?

Winberg Chai says:  

Cheng Li (China’s Team of Rivals) has oversimplified reality in his analysis of China’s future leadership by dividing it into two camps: the “populists” and the “elitists.” In fact, there are six equally important rival factions competing for the top two positions in the Chinese government.

These six factions developed within the six separate and equal political institutions that exist under the overall guidance of the Chinese Communist Party. They are: the Central Committee, the Discipline Commission, the People’s Government, the People’s Congress, the Political Consultative Conference, and the Central Military Commission. All of them recruit and cultivate their own followers. Each one has its own leaders, who are represented at the party’s Politburo. These six groups’ leaders have their own complex mix of agendas, ties, worldviews, personalities, and priorities based on their own personal experiences and that of their political institutions.

Cheng Li replies:

Winberg Chai’s argument that there are six equally important rival factions in the Chinese leadership is empirically groundless and conceptually misleading.

One of the defining political characteristics of the People’s Republic of China is the long-standing party-state system. By design, the leaders of the Communist Party have always held the most important official positions in the government, the legislative body, and the military. In fact, three of the six institutions that Chai mentions—the Central Committee, the government, and the Central Military Commission—are headed by the same person (currently, President Hu Jintao). These six institutions are neither “separate” nor “equal.” Quite the contrary, the institutions of the party and the state are intimately intertwined, with the government implementing the decisions of the party. Two other institutions on Chai’s list, the People’s Congress and the Political Consultative Conference, are well-known symbolic “rubber stamps.”

(Foreign Policy, May/June)

Climate Progress in China

It is time to retire the tired cliché that the United States cannot move forward on meaningful domestic legislation to protect our planet from the ravages of climate change unless China commits to do the same. Though they are not there yet, China today is beginning the transition to a clean-energy economy through a wide range of actions. These efforts should be encouraged and expanded upon.

The Center for American Progress argues that Congress must assess China’s efforts to pull its own weight on climate change—steps that will result in significant reductions in carbon emissions from the business-as-usual scenarios even as China’s economy continues to grow.

Looking forward to the U.N. climate change negotiations in Copenhagen at the end of this year, Congress must acknowledge that these efforts by China and complementary efforts by other countries, including the United States, will improve our chances of forging an agreement to solve the problem of global warming. (Julian Wong and Andrew Light, Center for American Progress)

North Korea and the Chinese Giant

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions clearly have high stakes for China, and the question now is not whether China will actively seek to rein in the North’s behavior, but rather, how it will do so.

China has demonstrated over the past few weeks its growing impatience with the North’s behavior and its readiness to take punitive measures against its communist ally. Reports from the United Nations indicate that China is receptive to U.S. calls for sanctions to punish the DPRK for its recent behavior. Beijing played a crucial role in bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table following the October 2006 nuclear test, and the United States is again looking to China to be a constructive partner in resolving the crisis.

But a healthy dose of caution must accompany this optimistic development. China’s chief endgame is stability, not the denuclearization of North Korea, and it is unlikely that China would take any actions that it believes would cause the regime to collapse or instigate it to escalate the situation further.

China will continue to be cautious and restrained in its actions, just as it has called for other nations to remain “cool-headed.” What we will likely see as the crisis unfolds is a China that is much more vocal in its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear and military programs and more disposed to participating in multilateral condemnations and economic sanctions against North Korea, but strongly opposed to military responses, such as bolstering of bilateral U.S.-Japan and South Korea relations. (Winny Chen, Center for American Progress)

Cooperating With China in Latin America

Alicia Barcena, the U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s executive secretary, made note of China’s growing investments in Latin America and the Caribbean during a recent press conference in Santiago, Chile, suggesting “[t]here are promising hopes for Chinese investment in the near future.”

Indeed, China increasingly looks to the region as a primary source for raw materials to match its blistering pace of development. These growing ties between China and Latin America and the Caribbean raise a question for U.S. policymakers: How should the United States view China’s emerging presence in a region that was once considered—under the Monroe Doctrine—the United States’ sphere of influence?

The United States and China, as important investors in the region, could find ways to work together on helping Latin American and Caribbean governments tackle crime and insecurity. And the United States should seek China’s cooperation in the various institutions that comprise the Inter-American system—a system that makes a fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights. The United States could use these multilateral forums to ask China to uphold its policy paper commitments to promote a more equitable economic world order, as well as democracy in the international system.

China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to grow. So the sooner the Obama administration can find ways to cooperate with China in the region the better. Doing so would strengthen the United States’ standing in the region and would foster trust with one of its most important global economic partners―who happens to be evolving into a potential commercial rival to it south. In sum, focusing on an agenda that fosters mutual respect and engages Latin America and the Caribbean and its associates in finding solutions to regional and global challenges will not only deliver on the United States’ promise of seeking a “new era of partnership,” but perhaps succeed in turning a rival into an ally. (Stephanie Miller, Center for American Progress)

The Uprising China Would Have Us Forget

It's habitual to think of Zhao as China's almost-Gorbachev: the man who might have disestablished the Communist Party, and introduced political pluralism, if only the party hardliners hadn't got him first. Yet the painful sequence of events recorded in Zhao's testament suggests another, nicer comparison. For, as Zhao goes to enormous lengths to establish, what happened in Beijing in 1989 had no legal basis whatever.

It was, in point of fact, an invasion of the capital by several hundred thousand troops of the Chinese army at the behest of a private group of individuals within the communist leadership, because of a fear that the people had mobilised, and were coming out on the streets in support of the party's general secretary. As Zhao told Yang in 1995, "our party had never done such a thing in all its history".

In short, 1989 was China's Prague Spring, and Zhao was its Dubcek. Ever since, the Chinese Communist Party has been haunted by the obscure but troubling recognition that it is in effect an occupying power in its own country, a kind of benevolent foreign tyrant, like the Moghuls or the British Raj, such as colonised countries have known for centuries.

This is why, I'd suggest, we should take June 4 as our own moment to "tread on the greenery", and to honour the memory of a decent man and his patriotic supporters, even though China's spring is yet to return, and the wisteria is still nipped in the bud. (David Burchell, the Australian)